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BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD,

by Joseph Goldstein,

Anna Freud and Albert J. Solnit. New York: Free Press/MacMillan. Biblio. Index. 1979. Pp. x 288. $12.95 hardcover.
Karl G. Sorg*

The widely acclaimed and much quoted first work by the same
authors, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child,' has been influential in court decisions which reflect a growing societal concern for
effective child custodial placement within the parental setting.
The three psychologists now address the growing phenomenon
of state intrusion into the area of parental custodial rights. It
would seem that the authors' two works have been written in inverse chronological order, with the first book focusing on the determination of what constitutes the dominant psychological parenting
figure and urging the child's placement in that setting.
This work seeks answers to the question of when the state can
intrude upon and sometimes terminate a child-parent relationship.
The authors' conclusion is that intrusion by the courts should be
reduced to the absolute minimum at three critical stages: (1) at the
time of invoking state intervention; (2) at the time custody is being
adjudicated; and (3) at the time custodial disposition is being
made.
The obvious implication of urging minimal state intervention
into the parent-child relationship is a recognition of the judicial
concern in maintaining family privacy. The earlier cases of Meyer
v. Nebraska,2 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,' and Wisconsin v.
Yoder 4 focused on the balancing of state versus family interests.
* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University; A.B. Dartmouth; J.D. Ge-

orgetown University. Member Am. Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (V.P. Capital) Chap. 1963-65. Member Bd. of Dirs., Family Serv. Agency of No. Va. 1959-61.
1. J GOLDSTEIN, A FREUD, A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD,

(1973).

2. 262 U.S. 390 (1923), where the court ruled a Nebraska statute prohibiting
the teaching of the German language in the first eight grades in any school, public, private, denominational or parochial, was an unconstitutional intrusion by the
state in the family obligation to educate its young.
3. 268 U.S. 510 (1925), ruling that the Oregon statute requiring all children
in the state to receive their primary and secondary education in the public schools
was a violation of a fundamental family right. Justice McReynolds, writing for the
Court, stated: "The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations." Id. at 535.
4. 406 U.S. 205 (1972), holding that a Wisconsin statute compelling school
attendance until age 16 is violative of the first and fourteenth amendment rights
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These interests include the free exercise of religious preferences.
It was not until the case of Griswold v. Connecticut that Justice Douglas, in writing for the Court, constructed the concept of
family privacy from most of the elements making up the Bill of
Rights, namely: amendments 1, 3, 4, 5, and 9. 6 Three concurring
Justices accepted the Constitutional idea of family privacy extending to the use of contraceptives in the marital bedroom. However these Justices refused to engraft the first eight amendments
to that view, as did Justice Douglas, utilizing instead the ninth
amendment as the sole repository of that right. Eisenstadt v.
Baird7 extended the private rights of the citizen to contraceptives
in his or her bedroom without regard to marital status.
The rights of the individual to privacy have been extended to
interracial marriage,' the woman's right to terminate a pregnancy
of Amish parents to discontinue formal education for religious reasons.
5. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6. U.S. CONST., amend. I:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST., amend. III:

No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the

consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed bylaw.
U.S. CONST., amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person of things to be seized.
U.S. CONST., amend. V:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. IX:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
7. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
8. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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(whether married9 or pregnant out of wedlock' 0 and without regard
to spousal consent" or parental consent, in the case of a minor). 1 '
Accordingly, Goldstein, Freud & Solnit (hereinafter "Goldstein") deem it appropriate to suggest that government intervention into the relationship of parent and child should be severely
curtailed. The authors could point to the judicial precedents referred to earlier to support that suggestion. 3 But more recent
cases have indicated that Constitutional conservatives have been
willing to let government interfere with the parent and child relationship in order to impose a morally righteous intrusion into what
once was believed to be the business of the family." Nevertheless,
Goldstein persuasively demonstrates the psychological damage
that can be done by removing a child from a parental setting
without first making a serious inquiry into, and determination of,
gross parental abuse which mandates placement in a non-parental
setting.
Goldstein, in Beyond the Best Interests of the Child," established guidelines for placement and emphasized in that work what
he emphasizes here, namely: that "so long as a child is a member
of a functioning family, his paramount interest lies in the preservation of his family." The authors also warn that this emphasis is not
to be construed as a justification per se for state intervention. On
the contrary, the primary thrust is for the state to refrain from
intrusion into the establishment and continuity of the psychological ties of the child to a parent or his parents. (It should be noted
here that Goldstein is responsible for promulgating, at least in legal literature, the notion that the parent to whom the child looks
for nurturing, guidance, direction and purpose is the "psychological" parent, who may not be the natural or biological parent). The
psychological parent is the one to whom the child looks for paren9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
11. Planned parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
12. Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra note 10.
13. The cases of Meyer v. Nebraska, Pierce Society of Sisters, Wisconsin v.
Yoder, supra notes 2, 3, 4.
14. See, e.g., the case of Moore v. Simms, 442 U.S. 415 (1979), where a majority of the Supreme Court in an opinion by Rehnquist, J., invoke the abstention
doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 402 U.S. 37 (1971), to avoid utilizing the privacy
arguments of Griswold, note 5, supra in order to let stand a termination of parental rights to a child in proceedings where the parents' right to be heard was seriously in doubt. See dissent of Stevens, J., 442 U.S. at 428.
15. Supra note 1.
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tal nurture, guidance, direction and purpose. Further, the psychological parent is established, in the mind of the child, early in the
child's development, as the parent who is the nurturing parent. Attempts to alter the child's conception of parentage must be made
in the child's own time. To a one-year old child, eight months is
two-thirds of his life. The parenting he receives in those eight
months is far more significant to him than eight months of parenting is to a twelve-year old child.
Goldstein points out that since the very young child is almost
totally dependent on the parent, attachment develops quickly to
the parent, parents, or family regardless of the society's view of the
attachment. This attachment causes traumatic psychological repercussions to the child if significantly interrupted or interfered with,
particularly by an instrumentality as insensitive as the state. Obviously, there are times when the state is called upon or compelled to
intervene into the privacy of the family relationship, but the authors caution against overly broad intervention statutes that give
overly zealous social workers, lawyers, judges and moralistic meddlers the opportunity to impose their personal preferences on unwilling parents.
When is state intervention appropriate? In some matters intervention is necessary because of a clear societal consensus. But in
other situations where a clear consensus does not exist, intervention is statutorily permitted. However, the standards for intervention are imprecise. In the case of a clear societal consensus one sees
the development of such ideas as prohibiting a parent from selling
his child into bondage. The statutory intervention situation deals
.with such imprecision as child neglect statutes where intervention
into and termination of parental authority may be undertaken if
the parents failed to "maintain a reasonable degree of interest,
concern or responsibility as to [their] child's welfare." 1" Most parents experience, at sporadic intervals, a waning interest in their
children. However a determination of when that interest has
waned sufficiently to permit intervention might result in different
interpretations of the statute by the courts. The Illinois Appellate
Court, First District, (4th Division) in the adoption case of In Re
Ladewig"7 had no difficulty in determining precisely when a "reasonable degree of interest . . . as to a child's welfare" had not been
met. The court stated that a statute need not be more specific
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4 § 9.1-1D(b) (1973).
17. 34 I1. App. 3d 393, 340 N.E.2d 150 (1975).
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"than is possible under the circumstances." 8 Thus, the Illinois
court, holding its hole card on a call (by the parent) says, "We see
what's here and we don't have to tell you more than we know. We
know what we've got-and it's good enough."
When state intervention is sought, Goldstein poses three questions regarding the decision to intervene:
(1) What constitutes probable cause for inquiry by the state into
a parent-child relationship and what findings should be required
before seeking modification or termination of that relationship?
(2) What is sufficient cause for state modification or termination
of the relationship?
(3) If modification or termination of the relationship is indicated,
which available alternative is least detrimental?
The three critical questions, the authors point out, are seldom
asked separately or in order. The questions are essential to and
concurrent with the three stages of decision, namely, invocation,
adjudication, and disposition. Minimum intervention therefore
suggests minimum intervention into each of the three stages of
decision.
Intervention occurs in several ways. The first ground for state
intervention arises out of a parental request. An example of this is
a parent asking the court to intervene in a custody dispute arising
out of an incident of marital dysfunction. Implicit in this situation
is the understanding that if the parents can arrange, without judicial intervention, for joint custody or for custody in one of the parents, then that arrangement should go undisturbed. My only concern with the Goldstein thesis is whether there is sufficient
assurance that the private parental arrangement has considered
the needs of the child, particularly where the child has been part
of the bartering process in which property, income, and status are
also put on the block. In other words, is this a setting in which
courts might inquire "beyond the best interest of the child."?
Another example of intervention arising out of parental request is the situation in which a request to terminate the relationship is made by one or both parents. This sort of request, the authors suggest, could relieve the parent from the pressure of an
abandonment action before such action became necessary. I would
suspect that this sort of parental request would be utilized infrequently. Guilt feelings imposed by societal expectations would, it is
suggested, result in child abuse or neglect, rather than in a petition
18. 34 Il. App. 3d at 397.
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to terminate the parental relationship.
The second ground for state intervention suggested by the authors is when a long-standing familial (non-parental) relationship
is sought to be substituted for a parental relationship. The foster
parent who has been identified as the parenting figure is an example. The very young infant will quickly form a psychological image
of the person who provides that initial nurturing, regardless of the
biological or genetic relationship. It is at this point, when such
bonding takes place, that intervention into the child-biological parent relationship would seem appropriate, says Goldstein, and such
intervention should take place before separation comes about with
the foster parent and child.
Goldstein proposes a statutory period during which the child
is in the direct care of an adult. This period would constitute
"maximum intervals beyond which it would be unreasonable to
presume that a child's residual ties to the absent parent" would be
of more significance than the ties to the foster parents. The statutory period proposed would be 12 months for a child under 3 years
old and 24 months for a child over three. Documentation of the
rationale for this recommendation is provided with telling effect by
Goldstein, citing case histories resulting in devastating after
effects.
The third suggested ground for intervention would occur when
gross failures of parental care become manifest. Examples are
death or disappearance of the custodial parent when no provision
was made for the children by him or her before the death or absence. Another example given is where the custodial parent is convicted of a sexual offense against the child, or where acquittal of
the same offense is based on a finding of mental incompetence.
The infliction of serious bodily harm on the child or the failure to
prevent repeated serious injuries to a child would be further examples cited by Goldstein where judicial intervention is appropriate.
As pointed out by Goldstein, the reason for intervention is as much
to prevent psychic harm to the child, resulting from abuse, as it is
to prevent future physical harm.
The final ground for intervention suggested by the authors is
parental refusal to authorize lifesaving medical care. Goldstein is
careful to limit intervention only to the occasions when, without
the medical procedure, the child would die. This eliminates judicial
intervention where a child, suffering from a backbone deformity
which condemned him to a lifetime in a wheelchair could be de-
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nied an operation. In the case of In Re Green 9 the child's mother
objected to the operation because of the slight risk of fatality that
could result from the operation and because of the likelihood of
the necessity of a blood transfusion, which violated the mother's
religious precepts.
A chapter is devoted to the need for counsel for the child
whose custody is being considered for termination or modification.
Goldstein closes with a plea for a society founded on what Professor Fuller has called "the morality of aspiration. ' 20 Such a society
would have fewer laws, less intervention by the state, and more
reliance on the moral good sense of the people to take care of their
own.
This work is every bit as timely and significant as Beyond the
Best Interests of the Child. It is carefully documented with case
histories and has, in one of the two appendices, a suggested code
for child placement. The book is absolutely essential to the family
lawyer's library. It should also be dog-eared in every welfare case
worker's office and be within arm's reach whenever the urge to correct the ills of society becomes overwhelming.

19. In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972).
20. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF THE LAW, (1969). In this work, Professor
Fuller points to the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophical exemplifications of
the "Good Life", excellence, and the full realization of human powers. In such a
life, the morality of duty, though underlying the "Good Life", is muted.

